Expressive Enlightenment: Subjectivity and Solidarity in  Daniel Garrison Brinton, Franz Boas, and Carlos Montezuma by Carr, R. Arvo
City University of New York (CUNY) 
CUNY Academic Works 
Publications and Research Queens College 
2018 
Expressive Enlightenment: Subjectivity and Solidarity in Daniel 
Garrison Brinton, Franz Boas, and Carlos Montezuma 
R. Arvo Carr 
CUNY Queens College 
How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know! 
More information about this work at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu/qc_pubs/214 
Discover additional works at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu 





Expressive Enlightenment: Subjectivity and Solidarity in  
Daniel Garrison Brinton, Franz Boas, and Carlos Montezuma 
 
 
Forthcoming in Ned Blackhawk and Isaiah Wilner (eds.), Indigenous Visions: Rediscovering the 
World of Franz Boas (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2017) 
 
 
 In September 1899, a German journal of geography called Globus published an obituary 
for the American ethnologist Daniel Garrison Brinton. It was one of a handful of signed 
obituaries that its author, Franz Boas, would write in his long career. Boas concluded his words 
on Brinton with the following evaluation:  
 
The importance of his example for the development of American anthropology cannot be 
overstated. For many years, his voice was the only one that called us back from the 
excessive specialization that had begun to pose a threat to the general scientific point of 
view in itself. If anthropology is to find a firm footing in America, it is thanks in no small 
part to the labors of the deceased.1 
 
Boas’s memorial to Brinton is a statement of devotion, an homage to a colleague who inspired 
and defended a collective scholarly enterprise—an “us” with which Boas clearly identified. Yet 
his devotion has gone entirely unremarked in histories of American anthropology, and this is not 
just a matter of archival oversight. Although Brinton has long been dismissed by historians as a 
racist, he also began a momentous new movement in American anthropology, a movement that 
Boas himself would bring to fruition. Yet to understand the affiliation that linked Boas to 
Brinton, it will be necessary to think in new ways about anthropology at the turn of the twentieth 
																																																								
1 Franz Boas, “Daniel Garrison Brinton,” Globus: Illustrierte Zeitschrift für Länder- und Völkerkunde, 76, no. 11 
(1899): 166. 
century and the social, moral, and discursive world within which this nascent discipline found 
itself.  
For a long time now, scholars have agreed that Boas’s relationship to Brinton was one of 
deliberate and successful supersession. Boas, the story goes, displaced Brinton and his methods 
on the way to becoming the preeminent anthropologist of his time.2 Little evidence exists to 
suggest that Boas and Brinton understood their relationship in this way, but this has rarely 
bothered historians of anthropology. They relate the narrative of Boas’s supersession of Brinton 
as part of a larger and more profoundly moralized story about how the American anthropological 
establishment learned to stop using race as an explanation for human difference and human 
behavior and to rely instead on the “modern, relativistic, pluralistic anthropological approach to 
culture.”3 These two narratives have become so thoroughly conflated, with Brinton playing the 
racialist foil to the rise of the Boasian culture concept, that it has become all but impossible to 
understand why Boas would want to single out Brinton as the “lone voice” who put American 
anthropology on a “firm footing.” 
The difficulty facing us can be traced back to Boas himself. Recent research by Lee 
Baker has shown that by the turn of the twentieth century Boas had come to see the fight against 
racism as the decisive struggle of his age. That struggle required that he deal with Brinton—a 
powerful, indeed founding, figure in the profession who was also a vocal segregationist and anti-
																																																								
2 On the displacement of Brinton by the Boasian “revolution” in Americanist anthropology, see Regna Darnell, And 
Along Came Boas: Continuity and Revolution in Americanist Anthropology (Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 1998). 
George Stocking has been the most influential exponent of the view that modern anthropology came into being with 
Boas’s pluralization of the culture concept. See George W. Stocking Jr., “Franz Boas and the Culture Concept in 
Historical Perspective,” American Anthropologist 68 (1966): 867–82.  
3 Stocking, Delimiting Anthropology: Occasional Inquiries and Reflections (Madison: University of Wisconsin 
Press, 2001), 23, cited in Lee Baker, Anthropology and the Racial Politics of Culture (Durham: Duke University 
Press, 2010), 8. 
miscegenationist—extremely gingerly.4 In the context of the struggle against racism, a public 
affiliation with Brinton would have introduced an unneeded twist into the moral narrative of 
racial inclusiveness that Boas was striving to construct. Yet Boas’s calculated effort to dodge any 
affiliation with Brinton in the North American press might also be seen, in light of his far-flung 
obituary, as an effort to protect his predecessor’s reputation by keeping him out of a fight that 
Boas knew he was doomed to lose. Boas recognized that history had drawn him into a global 
fight against racism and he embraced the challenge; but his homage to Brinton can be read as an 
acknowledgement that their conflict over race had made it impossible to actualize other scholarly 
possibilities, affiliations, and struggles. Boas’s memorial demands that these possibilities be 
brought to light. It compels us to ask: What intellectual projects had to be displaced or silenced 
in order for the culturalist critique of race to become the basis of American anthropology? 
In this paper I want to recover one of these set-aside projects, the one that Boas saw 
Brinton as having fostered, thereby providing the “firm footing” he stood on throughout his 
career. This project, which Brinton referred to as “the philosophy of expression,” he first 
conceived as an intervention in the field of comparative philology inspired by Wilhelm von 
Humboldt’s axiom on the fundamental nature of language. “In itself,” Humboldt had proclaimed, 
language “is no product (Ergon), but an activity (Energeia).”5 Language, Brinton learned from 
Humboldt, was not a ready-made object that could be looked upon from the detached perspective 
favored by natural scientists, for it was only by virtue of linguistic practice—people using 
																																																								
4 Ibid., chap. 1, 3. On Brinton’s racism see, e.g., Stocking, “Lamarckianism in American Social Science, 1890–
1915,” in Race, Culture, and Evolution, 234–270. 
5 Brinton ascribed the neglect of “linguistics” by anthropologists to “a strong aversion which I have noticed in many 
distinguished teachers of physical science to the study of language and the philosophy of expression.” Daniel 
Garrison Brinton, Essays of an Americanist (Philadelphia, Porter and Coates, 1890): 193. Brinton’s most sustained 
discussion of Humboldt and the ergon-energeia distinction is “The Philosophic Grammar of American Languages, 
as Set Forth by Wilhelm von Humboldt,” Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society XXII, no. 120 (1885): 
306–331. 
words—that different forms of human experience (including the experience of scientific 
knowledge) were constituted. 
On the basis of this understanding, which came to be known as the “expressive-
constitutive” dimension of language, Brinton departed from his American contemporaries. He 
elaborated in the 1880s a methodological critique of the ascendant “naturalistic school” of 
linguistic anthropology, a critique that he would soon apply to all those scientists who had fallen 
under the sway of “the positive philosophers, who insisted that events and institutions must be 
explained solely from the … objective world.”6 It was due to Brinton’s attempt to conduct the 
human sciences from a first-personal perspective—an intervention that began with his 
Humboldtian reconceptualization of language as “expression”—that Boas credited him with 
putting their common discipline on a “firm footing,” notwithstanding the fact—which Boas also 
saw—that Brinton never ceased to defend a theory of “psychic unity” that contradicted, even 
fettered, his most promising insights. 
Boas took over Brinton’s philosophy of expression and reformed it by abandoning its 
naturalistic ontology of the human psyche. One outcome of this work of rectification was a thesis 
that might be read as a leitmotif of Boas’s entire career. “To the ethnologist,” Boas wrote, “the 
most trifling features of social life are important because they are expressions of historical 
happenings,” and not, as Brinton had thought, because those facts are “expressions of the general 
consciousness of Humanity.”7 What is the difference between “history” and “the consciousness 
of Humanity,” and why did it matter to Franz Boas? And why, at the same time, was it important 
to him to retain the concept of expression? If we can come to some understanding of the stakes 
																																																								
6 On the “expressive-constitutive” view of language, see Charles Taylor, Philosophical Arguments (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1995): 109–112. Brinton, An Ethnologist’s View of History: An Address before the 
Annual Meeting of the New Jersey Historical Society (Trenton, 1896): 13. 
7 Boas, “The Aims of Ethnology,” in Race, Language and Culture (New York: Macmillan, 1940), 632; Brinton, 
citing Albert Hermann Post, in “An Ethnologist’s View of History,” 13. 
of this highly abstract disagreement—which is also a moment of concurrence and continuation—
we can begin to make sense of Boas’s Globus memorial and, more importantly, reconstruct how 
Boas built upon Brinton’s “firm footing” a viable discipline, universal in scope and possessed of 
a moral vision of knowledge as a collective practice of symbolic self-becoming. 
The mode of expressive enlightenment in which Boas and Brinton both took part, far 
from being limited to the pages of journals, was an ethical attitude distributed far and wide 
across turn-of-the-century American culture. Anthropologists participated in it, but they were not 
its inventors. What we risk failing to see, if we consider Boas’s understanding of human 
language solely from the perspective of Euro-American intellectual history, is that circulating 
media like the Yavapai physician Carlos Montezuma’s activist newspaper Wassaja and the 
NAACP’s Crisis, edited by W. E. B. Du Bois, also drew upon and fulfilled a “philosophy of 
expression” that bore a family resemblance to, but was not wholly descended from, the kind of 
disciplinary knowledge put into practice by Boas himself.8 Instead of positioning Brinton and 
Boas as adversaries, stand-ins for race and culture, we can understand both better when we 
recognize their mutual imbrication in this wider discursive field—a rhetoric of expression that 
charged the cultural politics of race with philosophical urgency, inspiring a social project to 




 Although the term “expression” has a long Euro-American history, it took on a new 
significance following the emergence in Europe of a self-consciously modern form of 
																																																								
8 See Robert Gooding-Williams, In the Shadow of Du Bois: Afro-Modern Political Thought in America (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2009): 1–65. 
subjectivity that the philosopher Charles Taylor has referred to as the “disembedded” or 
“buffered” self. This new kind of self found itself possessed of new “powers of moral ordering” 
that enabled and encouraged an attitude of holding oneself apart from the natural world and the 
extra-human influences that, in a previous era, had penetrated the “porous” self as part of that 
world.9 
 The newness of this situation manifested itself in a new kind of philosophical inquiry into 
the history of the human faculties, an inquiry whose classic question—How did human language 
originate and develop from pre-history to the present?—inspired a richly variegated genre of 
speculative history. This genre of philosophy was about more than language considered 
objectively. By inquiring into the origins of language, the philosophes of the eighteenth century 
were engaged in a process of self-interpretation, a coming-to-terms with the mysterious sources 
of their own peculiar form of experience. How one answered the question of language’s origin 
carried high stakes because variant answers entailed different attitudes about how one ought to 
live one’s life in the present day. 
 This was the ethically charged context in which an expressive theory of language 
emerged in the modern West, most decisively in the writings of Johann Gottfried Herder. 
Herder’s impact on American anthropology has been discussed in many ways, but what I want to 
trace here, following Taylor, is the way Herder took it upon himself to theorize and model a 
whole style of modern self-comportment.10 Like other philosophers of his time, Herder 
celebrated the buffered self’s new powers of self-definition. Yet he worried that the people of his 
																																																								
9 Charles Taylor, A Secular Age (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007), 27. 
10 For a different view of Herder’s influence on American anthropology, see Gerald Broce, “Relativism and 
Discontent: Herder and Boasian Anthropology,” Annals of Scholarship 2 (1891): 1–13, and George W. Stocking Jr., 
Race, Culture, and Evolution: Essays in the History of Anthropology (New York: Free Press, 1968), 214. For 
Taylor’s reading of Herder, which I’m largely following here, see “Language and Human Nature,” in Human 
Agency and Language: Philosophical Papers, Volume 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press): 215–247, and 
“The Importance of Herder,” in Isaiah Berlin: A Celebration, eds. Edna and Avishai Margalit (London: Hogarth 
Press, 1991): 40–63. 
age were morally lost, set adrift from one another in a vast and increasingly confusing world 
from which older forms of belonging and certainty had vanished. Herder exhorted would-be 
philosophers of his day to consider the demands placed upon reason by their historical 
predicament. “You can no longer have effect like Socrates—for you lack the small, narrow, 
active, compressed stage!” he exhorted in a 1774 essay, This Too a Philosophy of History for the 
Formation of Humanity. “A citizen of the earth, and no longer a citizen at Athens, you naturally 
also lack the perception of what you should do in Athens, the certain feeling of what you do, the 
sensation of joy at what you have accomplished.”11 Herder’s preeminent concern, given the 
eclipse of this older moral universe, was to discern how modern experience might give rise, in a 
fundamentally new way, to “a perception of what you should do … the certain feeling of what 
you do.”  
The trouble with modernity, as Herder saw it, was that its ways of organizing social space 
could no longer provide an obvious path to older “feelings” of moral certainty. The flip side of 
the buffered self’s new powers of moral ordering was that such feelings could no longer be seen 
as immanent in pre-defined roles and relationships, as they had been in ancient Athens. “The 
feeling of what you do,” if you are Socrates (or, more precisely, Herder’s imaginary Socrates), is 
bound up with the fact that it’s a common practice to talk about metaphysics over a six-hour 
dinner, or to cajole one’s neighbors on their way home from the marketplace. Herder saw that he 
inhabited a much larger and more impersonal world, increasingly mediated not by face-to-face 
interaction but by infrastructures of communication—newspapers , scholarly institutions, the 
state. These media abstracted speech from its scenes of utterance and reproduced discourse as an 
objective social fact, what would later be called “information.” 
																																																								
11 In Philosophical Writings, Michael Forster, ed., Philosophical Writings (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2002), 342–43, Herder’s italics. 
This state of affairs could not simply be rejected. Herder’s powerful new idea was to 
associate the “feeling of what you do” in modernity with the very practice that modern life 
seemed to have rendered obsolete or at least invisible—the act of speech itself, undertaken 
against all odds and even with no interlocutors present at hand. As he urged his modern Socrates,  
 
The scope of your sphere perhaps compensates for the less determinate quality and 
lacking quality of your beginning! A hundred people will read you and not understand 
you, a hundred read and yawn, a hundred read and despise, a hundred read and slander, a 
hundred read and prefer to have the dragon-chains of habit and remain who they are. But 
keep in mind that perhaps a hundred still remain left over with whom you bear fruit – 
when you are long since decayed, still a world of posterity which reads you and applies 
you better. World and world of posterity is your Athens! Speak!12  
 
What’s remarkable about this passage is the way it enacts what it’s trying to describe. Herder 
communicates to his readers with a kind of speech capable of demonstrating how speech itself 
can be experienced as answering to a moral imperative. He thinks speech can be made 
intelligible to his readers in this way because they are buffered selves living in a social world that 
has closed down certain “feelings of what to do” but opened other ones up—above all, the 
feeling that, by being brave enough to “Speak!” to a world of strangers, one might give rise to a 
kind of enunciation that circulates with an unprecedented range, beyond this “world” and into a 
“world of posterity.” Herder’s text is a foundational elaboration of the constitutive picture of 
language that would soon become associated with the term “expression.” 
Herder’s early formulation of the expressive-constitutive dimension of language would 
have profound ramifications in Germany and beyond. Kurt Müller-Vollmer and others have 
shown, for instance, that Wilhelm von Humboldt’s picture of language as an Energeia rather 
																																																								
12 Ibid., 343. 
than an Ergon was indebted to Herder’s notion of speech as a medium of world-making.13 
Herder’s understanding of what Sean Kelly has called “perceptual normativity”—his sense that 
the “feeling of what you do” is given not by some impersonal moral law but by one’s embodied 
experience of a specific situation—might also be seen as a source of Humboldt’s insistence that 
the historian has a moral obligation to “enliven and refine our sense of acting on reality” and to 
shun “metaphysical” forms of inquiry that require an “abstracting from all experience.”14 Herder, 
and Humboldt too, thus developed one way of coming to terms with the historicity of the 
buffered self and its powers. But it was not the only way.  
Today, the best-known account of the origins of humans’ linguistic powers is Étienne 
Bonnot de Condillac’s Essay on the Origin of Human Knowledge (1746). Like Herder, Condillac 
had both a theoretical story about language’s relation to modern experience and a moral vision of 
how that story pertained to the scientist’s “task.” Whereas Herder argued that forms of subjective 
experience vary throughout history, Condillac insisted that human experience is the 
transhistorical process through which we take in sensory data and organize them into thoughts. 
We do this by means of the “operations of the mind,” chiefly language, since “ideas connect with 
signs.”15 Condillac’s idea of language can be understood as a naturalistic philosophy of 
experience, since the fact that “ideas connect with signs” is in the first instance a fact about 
nature, not about human beings.16 According to Condillac, our cognitive faculties never 
fundamentally change, even though we learn over time based on trial and error. History, in this 
																																																								
13 Mueller-Vollmer, “Thinking and Speaking: Herder, Humboldt and Saussurean Semiotics. A Translation and 
Commentary on Wilhelm von Humboldt's “Thinking and Speaking: Sixteen Theses on Language,’” Comparative 
Criticism 11 (1989): 159–214; Taylor, “Language and Human Nature,” 232. 
14 Sean Kelly, “Perceptual Normativity and Human Freedom,” accessed at http://philpapers.org/rec/KELPNA; 
Humboldt, “On the Historian’s Task,” translated in History and Theory 6, no. 1 (1967), 61, 60. 
15 Condillac, Essay on the Origin of Human Knowledge, Hans Aarsleff, trans. (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2001), 4, 5. 
16 In Eden, Condillac tells us, Adam and Eve lived human life to its fullest without ever having recourse to language 
(see Essay, 113). But when humankind was cast out into the fallen world, language was there, waiting to be 
discovered. God didn’t have to invent it at the moment of the fall; it was already part of the plan. 
view, is the story of our coming to a better understanding of the limits we’ve been placed under 
by nature. And since we already have a good sense of how nature works from mechanical 
sciences like physics, we can get more certain about who we are by trusting the same methods.  
While claiming to avoid the “confusion which now prevails in metaphysics and moral 
philosophy,” Condillac conferred an implicit moral duty upon the buffered self. He insisted upon 
humans’ obligation to live within nature-determined limitations on what it is permissible to think 
about oneself and one’s place in the world—a view that would later be called the “ethics of 
belief.”17 What distinguishes this ethical project of the buffered self from Herder’s is that it 
understands our “feeling of what to do” as the result of objective laws, not as a historically 
emergent activity arising from the contexts of particular forms of life. It is a scheme of moral 
improvement designed for the buffered self, and only the buffered self, to excel at. 
 While Herder’s philosophy of language, through the mediation of Humboldt, found its 
way into the learned institutions of Prussia, Condillac’s found fertile ground in the young United 
States, where it would captivate the imagination of American linguists until well after the Civil 
War.18 In the generation leading up to Brinton’s entrance onto the scene, its most up-to-date 
articulation was William Dwight Whitney’s theory of languages as “institutions.” For Whitney, 
to say a language was an institution meant that it was collectively invented or “instituted,” and 
not discovered. This was a significant departure from Condillac’s conception of language as a 
naturally endowed faculty, but it reproduced his view that language had a purely instrumental 
role in human betterment. Whitney saw languages, like “steam-engines,” “tubular-bridges,” and 
																																																								
17 Condillac,Essay, 80. For the “ethics of belief,” see Clifford, “Ethics of Belief,” Contemporary Review 29 (1877): 
289–309. Like Condillac, Clifford’s essay aligns our improvement as moral beings with our aptitude at coming to 
terms with the cognitive limitations that nature has put us under. For one contemporary version of this position, see 
Richard Dawkins, The God Delusion (New York: Mariner Books, 2008). 
18 The best accounts of the influence of Condillac on early American philologists in the first half of the nineteenth 
century are Hans Aarsleff’s introduction to Humboldt, On Language (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2001): xi–xxxix, and Sean Harvey, “‘Must Not Their Languages Be Savage and Barbarous like Them?’: Philology, 
Indian Removal, and Race Science,” Journal of the Early Republic 30, no. 4 (Winter 2010): 505–32. 
“Brussels carpets,” as an “instrument of thought, the machinery with which the mind works; an 
instrument by which its capacity to achieve valuable results is indefinitely increased, but which, 
far from being identical with it, is one of its own products; with and by which it works with 
freedom.”19 
 Central to this understanding of language is the supposition that the human mind can 
abstract itself from the flow of experience, bringing the “freedom” of a third-personal 
perspective to bear upon itself. It is only from this detached standpoint that human freedom can 
be imagined to exist in a purely “negative” relation to its products—indeed, so much so, that it 
would seem to diminish human freedom to argue, as Herder had done, that language is in some 
way constitutive of our “feeling of what to do.” Whitney dubbed linguistics a “historical” 
discipline because its object of study was a human invention; yet by construing language as an 
invention— a product, an Ergon—he did what Humboldt said the historian should never do. He 
considered historical phenomena in abstraction from experience. “The facts of language,” 
Whitney famously remarked, “are almost as little the work of man as is the form of his skull.”20 
One can understand why the founder of semiology, Ferdinand de Saussure, whose linguistics 
course was premised on the regimentation of the diachronic and experiential by the synchronic 
and systematic, spoke of Whitney as “l’Américan Whitney que je révère.”21  
Shortly after his return from graduate school in Europe, Brinton dedicated himself to 
articulating a Humboldtian “philosophy of expression” capable of standing up to the “naturalistic 
school” that predominated in the human sciences of his time.  He did everything he could to play 
Herder to Whitney’s Condillac. Whereas Whitney insisted that language was an internally 
																																																								
19 William Dwight Whitney, Language and the Study of Language (New York: C. Scribner & Co., 1867), 420. 
20 William Dwight Whitney, “Are Languages Institutions?” Popular Science Monthly 7 (1875): 142–160, 51-2. 
21 Cited in John Joseph, From Whitney to Chomsky: Essays in the History of American Linguistics (Amsterdam: 
John Benjamins, 2002), 19. 
coherent formal system that obeyed natural laws, Brinton saw each language as a “thought world 
in tones” shaping our experience such that it couldn’t be analyzed in a purely objective fashion.22 
Whereas Whitney cautioned his readers against “metaphysical” theories of language coming out 
of Germany—theories that could only constrain human freedom by misidentifying it as one of its 
“institutional” creations—Brinton insisted that language, “which will perish only when 
intelligence itself, in its highest sense, is extinguished,” was indistinguishable from human 
cognition and thus from freedom itself.23  
Brinton made his neo-Humboldtian project relevant to late-nineteenth-century Americans 
by emphasizing dimensions of language that could only be characterized from the first-personal 
point of view of a historical subject. These dimensions had been utterly effaced by naturalistic 
linguistic methods, which approached language as an Ergon—not as a creation of God, 
necessarily, but as something that existed in nature as a complete and coherent system. To say 
language is complete and coherent is to assume that there exist clear boundaries that separate it 
from other entities in the order of Nature. It was owing to Brinton’s sense of the inadequacy of 
this parceling-out of the precincts of Nature that Boas would later remember him as having 
“called us back from the excessive specialization that had begun to pose a threat to the general 
scientific point of view in itself.”  
 And yet, despite Brinton’s avowed allegiance to the Humboldtian way of looking at 
language, in key respects he departed from the Humboldtian historian’s task of refining “our 
sense of acting on reality.” Boas put his finger on this problem in his obituary, where he wrote 
that “Brinton’s strengths and weaknesses were conditioned by his intellectual disposition, which 
																																																								
22 Brinton, “Philosophic Grammar,” 311. 
23 Whitney, “Are Languages Institutions?” 144; Brinton, “An Ethnologist’s View of History,” 10. 
saw in all particularities above all the verification of the universal law.... Hence the richness of 
his stimulating thought and the lack of penetrating analysis of individual phenomena.”24  
 Boas’s identification of Brinton’s shortcoming as an inattentiveness to “particularities” is 
more than just a question of scale, of Brinton being interested in big things and Boas being 
interested in small things. What’s at stake here is Brinton’s oscillation between the two styles of 
being a buffered self that I identified earlier with Condillac and Herder. Thus the unresolved 
conceptual tension—reflected in Brinton’s famous slogan, “Man is everywhere different, and 
everywhere the same”—between the constitutive power of human language on the one hand and, 
on the other, what Brinton called the “psychic unity of man.”25 The question that repeatedly 
arises in Brinton’s work is whether this “psychic unity” does not itself possess the character of an 
Ergon, something coherent and complete that we step into when we are born—in which case the 
“sense of what you do” that manifests itself to particular people in particular situations would 
have little relevance to a general characterization of human experience. A similar question can 
ultimately be raised about the way Brinton understood the term “expression,” as for instance in 
the slogan I cited earlier, that “the facts of ethnology must ever be regarded as the expressions of 
the general consciousness of Humanity.”26 Are the members of humanity giving rise to these 
“facts” to be understood as constituting historically variable forms of life, or does “expression” 
merely refer to the mechanical process through which behavioral tokens are reproduced from a 
fixed “psychic” type? 
 Boas’s worries about Brinton’s ideas about language were borne out in the way Brinton 
imagined the anthropologist to engage with the world he studied. Unlike Herder and Humboldt, 
																																																								
24 Boas, “Daniel Garrison Brinton,” 166. 
25 Daniel Garrison Brinton, Notes on the Floridian Peninsula (Philadelphia: J. Sabin, 1859), 26. For a discussion of 
Brinton on “psychic unity,” see Regna Darnell, Daniel Garrison Brinton: The “Fearless Critic” of Philadelphia 
(Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania, 1988), 87–92. 
26 “Ethnologist’s View of History,” 13. 
Brinton’s study of subjectivity entailed a radical decontextualization of the self. He held that 
everything important about our experience is reducible to the contents of our consciousness. 
“Men,” Brinton wrote, “do not live in material things, but in mental states; and solely as they 
affect these are the material things valuable or valueless.”27 Neither our unconscious bodies nor 
the world beyond the buffered self can provide us with any moral guidance about the kinds of 
beings people essentially are. For Brinton, the most successful strategy for coping with the 
“milieu” beyond the mind was to withdraw from it entirely. “The progress of man,” he declared, 
“is his progress of gaining independence from nature, of making her forces his slaves and not 
leaving them his masters.”28 The metaphor of “mastery” here is not unrelated to Brinton’s 
investment in scientific racism. The downfall of the non-white races, Brinton proposed, was that 
they remained too embedded in environments that, over time, corrupted their bodies and minds. 
“The peculiar traits of races can with entire propriety be considered pathological; for the more 
completely they adapt a group to one environment, the more do they unfit it for any other.”29 
Brinton’s inclination to blame the environments that non-whites inhabited for their racial 
“pathologies” thus worked hand-in-hand with his investment in a certain picture of what it is to 
be a buffered self, a sum of “mental states” utterly cut off from one’s environment, the more cut 
off the better.  
The longer one spends with Brinton, the more difficult it becomes to determine whether 
the ethics of belief Brinton deployed to police his theory of “psychic unity” is best interpreted as 
an inconsistency in a fundamentally Humboldtian way of looking at the world, or whether 
Brinton’s entire “philosophy of expression” was just a way of sugarcoating the deflationary 
																																																								
27 Ibid., 14 
28 Brinton, “The Factors of Heredity and Environment in Man,” American Anthropologist 11, no. 9 (September 
1898): 271–77, 276. 
29 Ibid., 275. 
pessimism that followed from his erection of an unbridgeable “psychic” barrier between the 
world and the self’s experience of it. Ultimately, the best way to make sense of Brinton is to see 
him as attempting to rise to the challenge of self-interpretation that Taylor associates with 
modern selfhood, a project that is as much about coping as it is about coherence. Undoubtedly, 
Brinton was attuned to something unsatisfying about the intellectual world of his day. He saw in 
the Humboldtian tradition a theoretical solution to some of the problems posed by that world; but 
as a matter of practice, the third-personal, policing attitude gave him a clearer sense of moral 
purpose. 
Boas, in “The Limitations of the Comparative Method of Anthropology,” recognized this 
attitude in Brinton when he interpreted his predecessor’s notion of psychic unity as a 
consequence of having adopted the position that “anthropological studies must be confined to 
researches on the laws that govern the growth of society.”30 By maintaining that stance, Brinton 
left open a possibility—a way out of his “confinement”—that he himself was not able to realize. 
The question left open for Boas was, What else could anthropology be? 
 
II. Expressions of Historical Happenings 
 The epochal insight that Boas brought to American anthropology—the insight that, as we 
shall shortly see, made him a great if sometimes unwitting affiliate of the many projects of 
collective self-determination taking shape at the outset of the twentieth century—was that 
knowledge could be a means of affiliating oneself with the world and its people. In formulating 
this insight, Boas drew on many intellectual sources, including experiences with indigenous 
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collaborators.31 His first major statement of it was “The Study of Geography” (1887), written 
shortly after Boas’s return from Baffinland, in which Boas concluded of the “effort to delineate 
the earth’s surface” that “every step that brings us nearer the end gives ampler satisfaction to the 
impulse which induces us to devote our time and work to this study, gratifying the love for the 
country we inhabit, and the nature that surrounds us.”32 As Matti Bunzl has argued, Boas showed 
himself in this essay to be engaged in a scholarly project closely aligned with that of that of 
Humboldt and Herder.33 
 If Herder and Humboldt worked out a certain style of being a buffered self, one that seeks 
“to enliven and refine our sense of acting on reality” (Humboldt) and to seek the “feeling of what 
you do” (Herder) by turning outward and confronting one’s particular historical predicament, it 
was Boas who advanced this modern mode of self-interpretation by showing how the “feeling of 
what you do” derives from the affective solicitation presented by the objects one studies. Boas 
advanced a new form of science that paid homage to the ideas of Alexander von Humboldt’s 
Cosmos, and which Boas named cosmography—science that “has its source in the personal 
feeling of man towards the world, towards the phenomena surrounding him.”34 Whereas the 
“physicist” or “naturalist” seeks to gratify an “aesthetic impulse” driving him to systematize the 
chaos of experience, the force of the “affective impulse” drives the research of the 
cosmographer. Whereas Brinton thought that humans refine their psychic faculties by insulating 
themselves from their environment, Boas reimagined anthropological knowledge as a process of 
directing oneself outward, into the world. 
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 We are now in a position to understand the difference between Boas’s interest in 
historical happenings and Brinton’s interest in the “consciousness of Humanity.” For “The Study 
of Geography” might profitably be read as a theorization of the historian’s responsibility, as 
imagined by Wilhelm von Humboldt and his followers, to “enliven and refine our sense of acting 
on reality.” Boas viewed cosmography (and later anthropology) as a “historical science”—not 
merely, as Brinton had assumed, an effort to discover causal laws that history may bear out but 
never change.35 At this early phase of his career, Boas was concerned dramatically to expand the 
scope of who and what an intellectual might care about. “To the ethnologist,” Boas wrote, “the 
most trifling features of social life are important because they are expressions of historical 
happenings.”36 What makes these happenings expressive is not their emanation from humanity’s 
“universal consciousness,” but their existence as part of an affective exchange between the world 
“we inhabit” and the inquiring self. 
 Boas’s continuation of Herder’s project raises two questions. First, how could a vision of 
anthropology’s task that is so focused on the particularities of experience aspire to the 
universality and progressiveness of modern science? Second, in what way is Boas’s affective 
account of anthropological knowledge not—as the “philosophy of expression” might ultimately 
have been for Brinton—a just-so story told to render the alienation of the modern subject more 
bearable? Answering these questions in the right way can forestall a common misinterpretation 
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of Boas’s project, which holds that he was engaged in a project of “Counter-Enlightenment.”37 
This view sees Boas as part of a long intellectual movement traceable to Herder’s teacher Johann 
Georg Hamann, who abandoned the imperious claims of modern reason in favor of a relativistic 
celebration of the primal attachments of the “Volk.” Such an abandonment would amount to a 
reenchantment, or “unbuffering,” of the modern buffered self: it would solve the predicaments of 
modern truth-telling by demystifying modernity itself.  
But this isn’t at all what Boas wanted, for himself or anyone else. Boas shared in the 
characteristically modern aspiration to advance science, an endeavor which he believed “helps 
free us from the errors of the past.”38 Boas’s understanding of scientific progress was somewhat 
unusual, since he did not think the correction of scientific error developed from the replacement 
of bad “explanations” with better ones. Instead he followed Goethe in holding that “a single 
action or event is interesting, not because it is explainable, but because it is true.”39  If one 
approaches a phenomenon with an idea that it is a piece of data to be explained, one has already 
ceased to act as a world-oriented scholar and become something else: a “naturalist” governed by 
an internal “aesthetic impulse.”40 Unlike Brinton, Boas wanted to get back in touch with the 
phenomena of the world. He sought not only explanations but a heightened feeling of 
connectedness. 
As in the case of Brinton, Boas’s idea of the scholar’s proper relation to the world 
connected to his understanding of language.  In his “Introduction” to the Handbook of American 
Indian Language, Boas grounded his career-long inquiry into human symbolic activity in a 
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theory of what he called “secondary” understandings41. Secondary understandings are reflexive 
linguistic phenomena: they comprise our explicit self-understanding of our experience in all its 
dimensions. And yet, despite our modern aspiration to cognitively master our experience, Boas 
argued that secondary understandings are subject to contingencies of unconscious experience 
that are largely beyond our control.  “Even our scientific views, which are apparently based 
entirely on conscious reasoning,” Boas explained, are formed “under the influence of strong 
emotions.” To square the “Introduction” with “The Study of Geography,” our views are 
responsive to the “affective impulse” governing our experience, according to which the self finds 
itself ineluctably drawn into the world without knowing why ahead of time.42 In order for one’s 
secondary understandings to become better attuned to one’s environment, one has to get into the 
right relation not just with the world, but with oneself. One has to recognize oneself as the kind 
of being whose picture of the world is changeable. 
Boas’s theory of secondary understandings showed the attitudes of scientific experts to be 
subject to the very same “impulses” as the people whom they typically studied. This motivated 
his departure from Brinton on the question of how to respond to modernity and of who could 
take part in that response. In “The Aims of Ethnology,” Boas wrote that “the same kind of 
struggle that the genius has to undergo among ourselves in his battle against dominant ideas or 
dominant prejudice occurs among primitives and it is of particular interest to see in how far the 
strong individual is able to free himself from the fetters of convention.”43 Moments like these, 
which recur throughout Boas’s writings, reveal their author’s enthusiasm for a certain project of 
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enlightenment, a freeing of humanity from superstition. But in order to understand the modes of 
relation to the people Boas persisted in calling “primitive”—that is, colonized people—that his 
version of that project made possible, it is important to grasp the term “enlightenment” in its full 
dimensionality. 
One understanding of the Enlightenment, Enlightenment with a capital E, holds that it 
was a period of intellectual and cultural history. Those who see Boas as part of the “Counter-
Enlightenment” tend to assume that he looked backwards upon the Enlightenment as a discrete 
period of history that was already complete, or that had proven itself incapable of completing 
itself, such that a new kind of inquiry, the Counter-Enlightenment, had to be initiated. It’s true 
that Boas, in his 1904 essay on the “History of Anthropology,” traced the origins of modern 
anthropology back to the classic Counter-Enlightenment figures—to Rousseau’s voicing of “the 
deep-seated feeling that political and social development was the result of a faulty development 
of civilization,” and to “Herder’s Ideen zur Geschichte der Menschheit, in which, perhaps for the 
first time, the fundamental thought of the development of the culture of mankind as a whole is 
clearly expressed.”44 There is a real sense in which everything Boas accomplished, his whole 
updating of the Humboldtian philosophy of expression, can be seen as the unfolding of a 
possibility emergent in this late-eighteenth-century moment. This raises the question of whether 
Boas did not take up a project that was anachronistic—or, worse, intellectually imperialistic—
from its very origin: what right did Boas have to recreate “primitive man” in the image of a 
Galileo or Spinoza, engaged in a “battle against dominant ideas or dominant prejudice”?  
If we take Boas seriously, such a question, which casts colonized peoples as an object (or 
Ergon) of scientific inquiry, examination, and explanation, misconstrues anthropology’s 
significance as a modernizing practice of enlightenment. For Boas, as for Herder, modernity 
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named a moral crisis that required a new receptivity to the constraints and possibilities emergent 
within a given form of life.  Over time, Boas came to study colonized peoples not to understand 
modernity’s pre-history, but to explore the variety of ways in which human beings attune 
themselves to the crises of the present. As he wrote in his preface to Race, Language and 
Culture: 
 
Growing up in our own civilization we know how we ourselves are conditioned by it, 
how our bodies, our language, our modes of thinking and acting are determined by limits 
imposed on us by our environment. Knowledge of the life processes and behavior of man 
under conditions of life fundamentally different from our own can help us to obtain a 
freer view of our own lives and of our life problems.45 
 
In turning back to Herder and Rousseau, Boas’s purpose was not to locate himself within a grand 
narrative of intellectual history, but to specify a problem that emerged in his own experience. 
Boas saw in these eighteenth-century figures the germ of an account of “our life problems” as 
“historical” in the particular sense with which he used that term, the sense of being solicited by a 
world toward which the self has to get in the right relation. 
 Enlightenment, then, can also be understood in the lower-case, not as a closed moment 
but as a continuing process, a coming-to-terms with history through the cultivation of a certain 
style of being a buffered self. We find a cognate understanding expressed in Michel Foucault’s 
later formulation of enlightenment as an “ethical attitude” as a mode of relating to the present 
times and to oneself as a modern subject. “To be modern,” Foucault writes, “is not to accept 
oneself as one is in the flux of the passing moments; it is to take oneself as object of a complex 
and difficult elaboration. …This modernity does not ‘liberate man in his own being’; it compels 
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him to face the task of producing himself.”46 It is this style of being a buffered self, this 
reckoning with today that culminates in the discursive constitution of a self with “a freer view,” 
that I want to understand as expressive enlightenment.  
 This form of expressive enlightenment—self-enlightenment through affective exchange 
with the world surrounding the buffered self—could only be achieved through an interaction 
with a world that was always already social, a world comprised of other selves possessed of 
other secondary explanations, all—Boas hoped—striving to get themselves attuned to the world 
in a way that gratified their “affective impulse” toward it. For Boas, expressive enlightenment 
was a mode of discursive affiliation that would connect the members of the human community 
with time. Toward the end of his life, he wrote, “It is my conviction that the fundamental ethical 
point of view to be taken is that of the in-group which must be expanded over the whole of 
humanity. This leads naturally to the conclusion that the individual must be valued according to 
his own worth and not the worth of a class to which we assign him.”47 To recognize individuals 
according to their “own worth” is to presuppose in those individuals themselves a capacity for 
self-production. Boas did not hesitate to say that this was the way he looked at the world and the 
way he sought to empower others. “My whole outlook upon social life is determined by the 
question: how can we recognize the shackles that tradition has laid upon us?” he wrote. “I 
consider it the duty of those who are devoted to the study of social problems to become clear in 
regard to these questions and to see to it that through their influence the intellectual chains in 
which tradition holds us are gradually broken.”48 
 Boas looked for allies in this project of enlightenment wherever he could find them, in 
other societies (where he found “primitives” engaged in the “same kind of struggle that genius 
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has to undergo among ourselves”) as well as in his own. To Boas, an enlightened attitude toward 
oneself seemed the only condition of modern belonging worth endorsing at a time when 
“secondary understandings” were creating new barriers between people. Boas, like Herder, saw 
that the modern creation of “the whole of humanity” followed from the unavailability of older 
forms of attachment. “On the whole in the history of mankind as the size of groups has 
increased, their solidarity has been weakened,” he wrote, “and with that the rights of the outsider 
have been recognized.”49 What makes up for the weakening solidarity of these expanding groups 
is a mode of belonging facilitated through discourse circulating among those “outsiders,” those 
who never subscribed to the in-group’s traditions or who expressively defined themselves in 
opposition to them.  
A solidarity constituted through the circulation of discourse requires peculiar protocols of 
mutual recognition through which members of expanding in-groups can manifest themselves to 
one another across time and space. One such protocol of mutual manifestation, for those 
committed to expressive enlightenment, was the term expression itself. As Foucault observes, 
Kant understood the Enlightenment slogan—Sapere Aude!—as a Wahlspruch or “a heraldic 
device, that is, a distinctive feature by which one can be recognized, and…also a motto, an 
instruction that one gives oneself and proposes to others.”50 Near the end of the nineteenth 
century, expression became the Wahlspruch of a new mode of enlightenment. Brinton and Boas 
both had a role to play in bringing this to pass; whatever their theoretical differences, they used 
the term to convey a shared intention to deal with the world, and one’s ethical relation to oneself 
as a knower of that world, in a new and more receptive way. From Brinton’s slogan that the 
“facts of ethnology are expressions of the general conscious of humanity” through Boas’s maxim 
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that “the most trifling events are significant because they are expressions of historical 
happenings,” we can witness the gradual refinement of a specific style of being a buffered self, 
one designed to cope with and contest a rival style of knowledge-making that looked upon the 
world as Ergon. 
 
III. Beckoning 
 Expressive enlightenment was not merely a form of scholarly knowledge, a Boasian 
strategy to build upon Brinton’s “firm footing” a viable scientific discipline. It was a relational 
form of becoming that gratified the “affective impulse” directing the inquirer outward, into 
affiliation with the world and its people. This activity of imagining new cross-cultural affiliations 
made a difference in twentieth-century America, but to appreciate its significance we need to 
look past the precinct of anthropology. Beyond the human sciences, the mode of expressive 
enlightenment was also discovered—simultaneously, as it were—by poets, philosophers, 
politicians, and social activists, who developed it in a diversity of inflections. Across American 
society, the Wahlspruch of expression, and the modern attitude of self-production that it 
signaled, facilitated the affiliation of disparate individuals who resolved to become themselves 
by speaking out in public.  
We can begin to appreciate the breadth of this collective manifestation by briefly 
considering the field of philology, a field that, like ethnology, underwent a momentous 
transformation in the last decades of the nineteenth century. One can trace this transformation—
closely connected to the emergence of the modern discipline of literary studies—precisely by 
following the etymology of “expression” in the published works of critics and rhetoricians 
around the turn of the twentieth century.  Prior to the rise of the English department in America, 
“expression” was a synonym for enunciation. It was part of a scholarly discipline through which 
teachers taught students to speak according to established rules of conduct.  As late as 1887, J. H. 
Gilmore, Professor of Rhetoric at the University of Rochester, could hope to find an audience for 
his Outlines of the Art of Expression, a “little book,” as described in its Introduction, that “has 
grown, in the author’s class-room, out of an attempt to supplement the defective early training of 
his pupils ...[with] a knowledge of those particular elements of Grammar which are distinctively 
characteristic of the English tongue.” Gilmore’s vision for the progress of his students’ 
knowledge had nothing to do with the process of self-becoming I’ve been calling “expressive 
enlightenment.” Speech was always to be governed according to elocutionary protocols authored 
by experts who had foretold all possible scenarios of decorous utterance.51   
By the 1880s, the days of Gilmore’s brand of prescriptive rhetoric were numbered. 
According to an influential cadre of ambitious young professors who taught English, not Latin, 
and who counted themselves as proponents of “modern” philology, the study of a literary text 
was to be imagined precisely as a mode of enlightenment. When Columbia professor Joel 
Spingarn, a leader of this new movement, insisted that great works of literature ought to be seen 
as exemplifying an “art of expression,” he explained at length that this phrase meant not that 
works of literature conformed better than other texts to certain prescribed “Rules,” but that the 
meaning of literature depended on its exemplary effect on the life of a reader.  Like Brinton and 
Boas, Spingarn traced this understanding of expression across the Atlantic and backward in time 
to thinkers like Goethe, Herder, and Hegel. It was with them in mind that he wrote, in his 1910 
lecture “The New Criticism,” that the basic objects and aims of literary inquiry were 
fundamentally expressive: 
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What has the poet tried to do, and how has he fulfilled his intention? What is he striving 
to express and how has he expressed it? What impression does his work make on me, and 
how can I best express this impression?52 
 
In modern philology as in Boasian anthropology, as witnessed later by Ludwig Lewisohn’s 
Expression in America (1930) and F. O. Matthiessen’s American Renaissance: Art and 
Expression in the Age of Emerson and Whitman (1943), the Wahlspruch of expression came to 
serve as a watch-word for those who saw literature as Energeia rather than Ergon.53 
Now, one could argue that this realignment of literature as a project of expressive 
enlightenment was not, in relation to anthropology, a “simultaneous discovery” so much as a 
parallel development derived from a common tradition—a separate branch of the same Romantic 
family tree. But this is not the path I want to pursue here, for two reasons: first, expressive 
enlightenment flourished even among peoples avowedly hostile to Euro-American intellectual 
traditions; and second, even among the scholarly elites we’ve been examining, expressive 
enlightenment was experienced not primarily as a set of theoretical propositions but rather as a 
way of re-imagining the social world in which they lived. The really important question raised by 
the ascendency of expression in ethnology and philology is not how an idea travelled, in ways 
we might not have recognized, between one intellectual and another, but rather how, at this 
particular moment in time, expression became a discursive basis for a new kind of collectivity. 
This gives us a way of coming back to the historiographical question about collective identity 
with which we started, the question of why the cultural politics of race can be thought about as 
unfolding within, traveling alongside, or even surrounding the history of expression.  
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One figure who can help us measure the scope of expressive enlightenment and its 
relation to the politics of cultural belonging is Carlos Montezuma, the Yavapai doctor, 
pamphleteer, and founding member of the Society of American Indians. Montezuma was a self-
declared “abolitionist.” Throughout his career, he advocated the immediate dissolution of the 
United States Office of Indian Affairs, which he saw as the latest in a line of Euro-American 
institutions designed to keep Indian people in a state of political and moral dependency. The 
result of these institutions’ influence, Montezuma said, was the stifling of a people’s self-
expression: 
 
The aborigines of America have never been in a position to express themselves. The 
game of “the survival of the fittest,” competition of life in God’s appointed way, “by the 
sweat of the brow,” have been too one-sided. It has been an awful unfair play to speculate 
and weaken, to satisfy your aesthetic propensities.  
 To judge a race relative to their standard we must put ourselves in their place; 
better still, be one of them.54  
 
 One could be forgiven for mistaking this for a rumination of Franz Boas, yet no evidence 
exists to suggest that Montezuma ever read a word Boas wrote. Montezuma’s opposition 
between “expression” and enlightened self-interpretation on the one hand (“to judge a race 
relative to their standard we must put ourselves in their place”) and, on the other, an “aesthetic” 
picture of an orderly universe subject to natural laws (“‘the survival of the fittest’…in God’s 
appointed way”) shows that he had found his own way to distinguish between “affective” and 
“aesthetic” speech, Energeia and Ergon. Throughout his career, Montezuma consciously 
modeled for his audience this expressive attitude—an attitude that he thought could help his 
																																																								
54 John W. Larner, Jr., ed., The Papers of Carlos Montezuma, M. D., Including the Papers of Maria Keller 
Montezuma and the Papers of Joseph W. Latimer, 1871–1952, microform (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 
Inc., 1983), reel 6. 
people come to terms with the predicament from which, as he put it in another speech, “we 
Indians are struggling in the dark to find a way out.”55  
 We can begin to understand how Montezuma imagined Indian expression as a response 
to his people’s historical predicament by looking at his self-published newspaper, Wassaja: 
Freedom’s Signal for the Indian. Wassaja arose as a counter-publication to the official organ of 
the Society of American Indians, the Quarterly Journal of the Society of American Indians (later 
the American Indian Magazine), which Wassaja frequently upbraided for its conciliatory attitude 
toward the Indian Bureau. Despite this political disagreement, though, the papers shared a 
commitment to fostering a new pan-Indian public by adopting a deliberately ecumenical attitude 
toward Indian speech. In the first issue of the Society’s Quarterly Journal, its editors announced 
their intention to print “any expression on any Indian subject.”56 What sets Wassaja apart for 
our purposes is the way it envisions the thematic open-endedness of Indian speech as an ethical 
attitude adopted at the level of the self. It wasn’t enough for Montezuma to publish “any 
expression on any Indian subject”; those expressions had to be loudly announced as historical 
events because Montezuma thought it was always politically significant when an individual 
Indian came into his or her public voice. “AN INDIAN EXPRESSING HIMSELF,” reads the 
headline over one letter to the editor, a letter that Montezuma framed in order to convey his 
understanding that expression was not merely a way of transmitting information about Indian 
affairs, but was itself the best kind of news. Wassaja modeled the attitude of expressive 
enlightenment that Montezuma wanted his readers to adopt. Not unlike Herder enjoining the 
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modern Socrates of his imagination to speak, Montezuma set out to enact and solicit the same 
kind of speech that he purported to describe. 
 Montezuma signaled to his readers his intention to use print discourse differently from 
journals like the Quarterly by undertaking formal experimentation in his prose and, as Robert 
Dale Parker has argued, in his poetry. Consider, for instance, the long poem “I Have Stood up for 
You” (figure 2).57 Thematically, the message of the poem seems relatively straightforward: the 
speaker wants his readers to know that they have a friend in Wassaja. “I have stood up for you,” 
he says, through all “your” struggles against the Indian Bureau and against what “the palefaces 
said.” But even as Wassaja gives his “you” the credit for surviving the antagonisms of 
civilization while offering encouragement by asserting his loyalty, a strange sense emerges at the 
end of the poem that Wassaja also wants to say the opposite. “You have proven yourselves to be 
/ Whatever I have stood up for you to be,” he avers—as if Indians ought to see themselves as 
having been constituted as a collective subject by virtue of what Wassaja has said on their 
behalf. Here Wassaja presents itself as unconditionally committed to Indian people and 
responsible for Indians being what they are.58 But how does this work? How can a paper stand 
behind—that is, follow—what it also claims to lead? More fundamentally, who stands behind—
or leads—Wassaja? 
Wassaja, it turns out, is the name Montezuma was given as a child by his Yavapai 
grandmother. The word may be translated into English as “signaling” or “beckoning,” which 
captures Montezuma’s sense of himself as a speaker to his people—and, as such, the creator of a 
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new community. Montezuma gave his newspaper his name because he observed no distinction 
between his subjectivity and its discursive manifestation. He was committed to an ethical attitude 
of expressive enlightenment that required him to continually reconstitute himself in response to 
the exigencies of the present. 
The verse form of “I have stood up for you” communicated this. Wassaja wanted to be a 
poet but, like Walt Whitman, he wrote most of his poetry in such a way that it sounded like prose 
when read aloud. Even today we recognize “I Have Stood Up For You” as a poem not because of 
its rhyme or meter but because when we look at the page we can see white space between the 
line-breaks and capital letters at the beginning of each line. Wassaja’s identity was bound up 
with the look and feel of print discourse, with speech spread over great distances into the hands 
and minds not only of associates but also of strangers. This is one way in which Montezuma 
modeled, in the content and form of his discourse, an ethical attitude committed to an ongoing 
project of self-production. 
In the pages of Wassaja, we can begin to see what it means to say that the mode of 
solidarity engendered by expressive enlightenment is fundamentally discursive. It is made for a 
world in which the voices of individuals circulate among strangers: “the wrong concept of us 
Indians which the public entertains, is a phantom which can be cleared away only by education 
and by our personal contact with the masses of the country,” Montezuma wrote in Wassaja in 
1916. “It therefore behooves us to stand together and to teach the public differently.”59 The 
implication is clear: if Indians don’t start speaking for themselves in view of a broader public, 
then they can’t be free. Like Boas, Montezuma understood freedom to consist in the revision of 
secondary understandings—the “phantom” caricature of Indian-ness that “must be cleared 
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away”—through a kind of proleptic speech that constitutes the “people” to which it repeatedly 
refers.60 
Montezuma’s advocacy for expressive enlightenment in Wassaja has discomfited 
commentators of all persuasions because it served as the engine of an emancipatory project, the 
abolishment of the Indian Bureau and its colonial infrastructure. At the center of this project was 
Montezuma’s animus for the Indian reservation. “The reservation,” Montezuma declared, “is a 
demoralizing prison, a barrier to enlightenment, a promoter of idleness, gamblers, paupers, and 
ruin.”61 Montezuma thought that Indians faced with the choice between the reservation and 
“enlightenment” should opt for enlightenment and leave the reservation behind. As reservations 
became sites of political and cultural mobilization, and ultimately homes and communities, many 
scholars came to see Montezuma as an “assimilationist.” After all, he seemed to advocate the 
abandonment of a distinctively Indian identity for a form of life imposed by a foreign power.62 
This view has its merits but it effaces Montezuma’s keenest insights into the mutual imbrication, 
in modern society, of power and discursivity. Montezuma attacked reservations because the 
government made use of them to squelch opposition. “There is a good reason why you do not 
hear from the Reservation Indians on freedom,” he wrote. “THEY ARE AFRAID to open their 
mouths.” 63 Notwithstanding his anti-reservationism, this was a powerful new way of soliciting a 
reconstituted and mass-mediated pan-Indian subject into being. 
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Montezuma’s insistence on the need to speak was based on his notion of enlightenment 
as an expressive process of self-transformation. The reservation system, he insisted, produced a 
caricature of Indians by imposing a “script they did not write themselves.” As he put it in a 1905 
article for the New York Daily Tribune: 
 
The reservation system has been a monument to the want of knowledge of human nature 
on the part of those who have been instrumental in perpetuating it. The failure to 
recognize the brotherhood of man in the Indian, that he was a multiple being, however 
ignorant he might be, and not more unified in his natural endowments and faculties than 
other men subject to similar conditions and environments, has been his greatest 
handicap.64 
 
Indian identity, Montezuma insists here, must be seen as an instantiation of human nature as a 
whole. It is in human nature to be a “multiple being,” not the cigar-store “phantom” 
(Montezuma’s coinage) that stood in for Indians in the public eye. I understand Montezuma’s 
idea of a “multiple being” to mean that Indians cannot, and must not, conform to the reductive 
and unilinear understanding of human development advanced by the Bureau of Indian Affairs. 
 Far from seeking to abandon a distinctively Indian identity in favor of a scripted vision of 
civilizationist progress, Montezuma saw expressive enlightenment as a way for Indians to fulfill 
their multiple and protean selves, embedded in families, communities, tribes, and broader 
regional networks that government-imposed identities obscured.  Montezuma’s misrecognition 
of the reservation as the source of his people’s troubles was a consequence—though not a 
necessary one—of his prescient search for a broader, self-determining Indian identity. But how 
could this more diffuse form of discursive solidarity be relevant or useful to American Indians 
living under a specific kind of settler-colonial repression? 
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 Montezuma’s answer to the challenge of living Indian life globally paralleled Boas’s idea 
of affective solicitation through the exchange of secondary understandings. Speaking in a genre 
of persuasion that parallels Herder’s This Too a Philosophy of History, Montezuma enjoined his 
Indian public to constitute itself in dialogue with those whose just-so stories about Indians 
threatened to flatten them into caricature: the Indian Bureau, politicians, and anthropologists too. 
In practice, the boundaries of Wassaja’s emergent public were necessarily porous. Montezuma 
wanted it that way. After all, he wrote, it was only “by our personal contact with the masses of 
the country” that Indian people could hope to correct the “phantom” image generated by the 
Indian Bureau.  
 Montezuma’s motivating responsibility as an agent of expressive enlightenment came 
from his Indian public, just as Boas’s came from anthropologists and Springarn’s from readers 
and writers of English. Wassaja listened to what the wider world—for instance, 
anthropologists—had to say, too. From time to time, when a sympathetic non-Indian wrote him a 
letter, Montezuma would publish it in Wassaja. But it only counted as news when a new Indian 
correspondent emerged or, better yet, when word came to him of a new Indian newspaper getting 
off the ground. “More Indian papers by the Indians the better,” he wrote in 1919. “It shows the 
Indians are coming out to express themselves.”65 By showing Indian and multiracial publics how 
one could “Speak!” from a position of phantom-like un-freedom, Montezuma, like Boas, brought 
himself into being. 
In his effort to make expressive enlightenment the basis for a pan-Indian social 
movement, Montezuma adopted an ethical attitude toward history and language that faces in the 
same direction as that of Franz Boas. As far as we know, the two never came into contact, but 
Montezuma’s expressive opposition to the “aesthetic propensities” of the Indian Bureau parallels 
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the disciplinary critique of “excessive specialization” and “positive knowledge” that Boas 
developed on the “firm footing” provided by Brinton’s philosophy of expression. It was through 
his own commitment to this scientific project that Boas was able to imagine anthropology as a 
collective emergence from the thralldom of tradition—not the thralldom to nature Brinton 
feared—and thereby imagine into being a global community comprised of those who would 
make it their personal responsibility to think and speak for themselves. 
For both Boas and Montezuma, the main obstacle facing the global community they 
envisioned—the “secondary understanding” to be overcome—was the widespread conception of 
human history as an unending race war. This was the understanding to which Montezuma 
referred when he spoke of “the game of ‘the survival of the fittest,’ competition of life in God's 
appointed way, ‘by the sweat of the brow.’” In place of this prevailing understanding Boas and 
Montezuma elected to put forward not a new master theory of human history—“WASSAJA is 
not writing a thesis,” Montezuma wrote in 1916—but a practice: a new form of expressive 
solidarity mediated by circulating discourse.66 
 To observe Boas’s unknowing affiliation with Montezuma is to see Boas from the global 
perspective for which he so often searched, and thereby, perhaps, to discover a broader set of 
communities in which he moved.  This may run against Boas’s own sense of his intellectual-
historical singularity, but in another way it confirms his intuition that exemplary forms of 
subjectivity, even of “genius,” can be recognized across the parochial boundaries between 
disciplines and endeavors. I want, in closing, to draw attention to two insights that this 
perspective brings into view.  
The first is that expressive enlightenment cannot be accounted for by tracing the 
transmission of knowledge among Euro-American elites. We must look backward from Boas to 
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Brinton, Humboldt, and Herder, but we must also look sideways to figures like Spingarn and 
Montezuma—to Boas’s contemporaries—in our effort to understand the pressures motivating 
Boas’s reformation of anthropological practice and the ideas those pressures generated. The 
second is that this sideways perspective on Boas can de-center the telos of the expanding “in-
group” that emerged as his hope for modern cross-cultural solidarity. As Montezuma and the 
Society of American Indians demonstrate, expressive enlightenment constitutes a subject who is 
a “multiple being,” a being who makes manifest his responses to local concerns within a 
particular discourse that addresses itself to a universal audience.  
This tenuous relation between the local and the global is encapsulated in the first number 
of the newspaper Montezuma competed with, the Quarterly Journal of the Society of American 
Indians. It occurs in an article by the editors advocating the study of ethnology in Indian 
boarding schools:  
 
And a new and still nobler and more important work awaits us: to demonstrate that there 
is a higher and more significant bond; the relationship of created things, one with another, 
and their inseverable kinship and relation with that Sovereign Power and Intelligence, 
whom some men reverence as God, and whom other men call the Unknowable, the 
Unseen, but whom Philosophy regards as the Totality of all things. And the American 
Indian race should be found in advance in this important labor.67 
 
There is something undeniably paradoxical about the way this universalistic effusion culminates 
in a statement of ethnic pride. Then again, there is something paradoxical about the situation of 
the Boasian knower, whether modern or “primitive,” who can only create an enlightened global 
in-group by wrestling with the misunderstandings furnished by his local discourse community. In 
both situations, the enlightened subject is expressed as a multiple self whose location lies at the 
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center of plural solidarities of very different scales. Montezuma and the social movement he 
helped bring into being can thus help us see something that Boas himself might not have 
realized: that the mediation of local concerns in the public discourse fostered by expressive 
enlightenment reproduces the same tension between in-group and out-group to which it claims to 
offer a solution. 
Today, there exist a number of scholarly vocabularies for discussing phenomena like 
expressive enlightenment that exist in both local and trans-local, or “glocal,” social space.68 The 
history of expressive enlightenment from Herder to Montezuma reminds us of the anxiety such 
glocal discursive phenomena produce for individuals. Much like Herder’s warning to his would-
be Socrates that he set out from “weak and indeterminate beginnings,” Montezuma’s assertion 
that the modern American Indian could never be “reconciled to his situation” must be read as an 
expression of the modern self writ large. The phenomenon of expressive enlightenment reveals 
the extraordinary motivation such irreconcilable situations provide for the constitution of 
discourse, and of subjects themselves. 
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